Report Nº: 110122/12/2024
The Court declared unconstitutional the indefinite reelection in Formosa. Apparently, this would put an end to caudillismo. However, the power of caudillismo is not in the indefinite reelection but in the co-participation regime that allows and encourages clientelism.
The Supreme Court issued a ruling declaring unconstitutional the indefinite reelection in Formosa. At first sight, this seems to end Gildo Insfrán’s government (Formosa’s governor) 30 consecutive years in power. But the ruling’s content is much less forceful. The Court points out that, within the framework of the federal regime, the governor’s terms have to be defined by the Constitution of Formosa without contradicting the National Constitution.
It may happen that a reform of the provincial Constitution is implemented adopting the national rule by which there may be indefinite but not consecutive reelection. In this case, the governor of that province or of any other province may intercalate in the government with the candidacy of a relative or a friend. As long as the citizens vote for them, the reelection of the ruling group will continue to be perpetual. There are precedents with these characteristics.
The question to be asked then is where do the conditions for the ruler to remain in power originate. In this regard, it is suggestive to analyze how tax co-participation is distributed and how it is used. According to the Ministry of Economy for the year 2024 it is observed that:
These data show that Formosa receives 2.6 times more co-participation than the average of the provinces. Clearly, the rest of the country shows solidarity with the Formosans. The problem is that this solidarity is channeled through a perverse mechanism: the co-participation that redistributes resources without conditions. With this scheme, rulers are induced to use public resources to perpetuate themselves in power.
The effort made by the rest of the country to provide resources to Formosa is used by its government to finance perverse clientelistic practices. According to the INDEC, in Formosa 30% of the employed are public employees and another 55% are informal workers who indirectly depend on the provincial government. Only 15% are salaried employees registered in private companies, many of which also depend on the government because they are suppliers of the provincial government or their shareholders are relatives and friends of the ruler. On the other hand, the co-participation allows Formoseños not to be taxed. More than 80% of the provincial budget is financed with co-participation and the rest is mostly generated with sales tax collected from companies located outside the province.
What the government of Formosa does not do with the co-participation is to develop the province. According to the 2022 Census, 38% of the homes have dirt floors, half of them do not have internet or computer and, according to the APRENDER tests, 35% of the children who finish primary school do not know how to read or write and 43% do not know mathematical operations for their age. With these social conditions, poverty and ignorance are reproduced, maintaining the dependence and subjugation that are the basis for the ruling clan to remain in power. The co-participation leads to the paradox that the solidarity of the rest of the provinces with Formosa serves to impoverish the Formosans.
The origin of Formosa’s poverty is not the indefinite reelection but the co-participation that gives the governors resources –financed by the rest of the country– to keep the population of the province subdued. This will not be solved by limiting the reelection of governors but by returning tax autonomy to the provinces, as proposed by President Milei. The general rule must be that each province should be self-financing. For the most backward provinces, such as Formosa, a transitory Convergence Fund with transfers conditioned to be used not for clientelism –as it happens with the co-participation– but for the economic and social development of the province.
